Author: Charlotte Dreisigacker-Sartor

EBA’s Action Plan on Sustainable Finance

Published on by Charlotte Dreisigacker-Sartor

Climate change and the response to it by the public sector and society in general have led to an increasing relevance of environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors for financial markets. It is, therefore, essential that financial institutions are able to measure and monitor the ESG risks in order to deal with risks stemming from climate change (learn more about climate change related risks in our previous Blogpost.

To support this, on 6 December 2019, the European Banking Authority (EBA) published its Action Plan on Sustainable Finance outlining its approach and timeline for delivering mandates related to ESG factors. The Action Plan explains the legal bases of the EBA mandates and EBA´s sequenced approach to fulfil these mandates.

Why is EBA in charge ? EBA mandates on sustainable finance

The EBA´s remit and mandates on ESG factors and ESG risks are set out in the following legislative acts:

  • the amended EBA Regulation;
  • the revised Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR II) and Capital Requirements Directive (CRD V);
  • the new Investment Firms Regulation (IFR) and Investment Firms Directive (IFD) and
  • the EU the Commission´s Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth and related legislative packages.

These legislatives acts reflect a sequenced approach, starting with the mandates providing for the EBA to oblige institutions to incorporate ESG factors into their risk management as well as delivering key metrics in order to ensure market discipline. The national supervisory authorities are invited to gain an overview of existing ESG-related market risks. In a second step, the EBA will develop a dedicated climate change stress test that institutions should use to test the impact of climate change related risks on their risk-bearing capacity and to take appropriate precautions. The third step of the work will look into the evidence around the prudential treatment of “green” exposures.

The rationale for this sequencing is the need firstly to understand institutions´ current business mix from a sustainability perspective in order to measure and manage it in relation to their chosen strategy, which can then be used for scenario analysis and alter for the assessment of an appropriate prudential treatment.

Strategy and risk management

With regard to ESG strategy and risk management, the EBA already included references to green lending and ESG factors in its Consultation paper on draft guidelines on loan origination and monitoring which will apply to internal governance and procedures in relation to credit granting processes and risk management. Based on the guidelines the institutions will be required to include the ESG factors in their risk management policies, including credit risk policies and procedures. The guidelines also set out the expectation that institutions that provide green lending should develop specific green lending policies and procedures covering granting and monitoring of such credit facilities.

In addition, based on the mandate included in the CRD V, the EBA will asses the development of a uniform definition of ESG risks and the development of criteria and methods for understanding the impact of ESG risks on institutions to evaluate and manage the ESG risks.

It is envisaged that the EBA will first publish a discussion paper in Q2-Q3/2020 seeking stakeholder feedback before completing a final report. As provided for in the CRD V, based on the outcome of this report, the EBA may issue guidelines regarding the uniform inclusion of ESG risks in the supervisory review and evaluation process performed by competent authorities, and potentially also amend or extend other policies products including provisions for internal governance, loan origination and outsourcing agreements.

Until EBA has delivered its mandates on strategy and risk management, it encourages institutions to act proactively in incorporating ESG considerations into their business strategy and risk management as well as integrate ESG risks into their business plans, risk management, internal control framework and decision-making process.

Key metrics and disclosures

Institutions disclosures constitute an important tool to promote market discipline. The provision of meaningful information on common key metrics also distributes to making market participants aware of market risks. The disclosure of common and consistent information also facilitates comparability of risks and risks management between institutions, and helps market participants to make informed decisions.

To support this, CRR II requires large institutions with publicly listed issuances to disclose information on ESG risks and climate change related risks. In this context, CRR II includes a mandate to the EBA according to which it shall develop a technical standard implementing the disclosure requirements. Following this mandate, EBA will specify ESG risks´ disclosures as part of the comprehensive technical standard on Basel´s framework Pillar 3.

Similar mandates are contained in the IFR and IFD package. The IFD mandate for example requires EBA to report on the introduction of technical criteria related to exposures to activities associated substantially with ESG objectives for the supervisory review and evaluation process of risks, with a view to assessing the possible sources and effects of such risks on investment firms.

Until EBA has delivered its mandates, it encourages institutions to continue their work on existing disclosure requirements such as provided for in the Non-Financial Reporting Directive (NFRD) as well as participation in other initiatives. EBA also encourages institutions to prioritise the identification of some simple metrics (such as green asset ratio) that provide transparency on how climate change-related risks are embedded into their business strategies, decision-making process, and risk management.

Stress testing and scenario analysis

The EBA Regulation includes a specific reference to the potential environmental-related systemic risk to be reflected in the stress-testing regime. Therefore, the EBA should develop common methodologies assessing the effect of economic scenarios on an institutions´ financial position, taking into account, inter alia, risks stemming from adverse environmental developments and the impact of transition risk stemming from environmental political changes.

Also the CRD V mandate requires EBA to develop appropriate qualitative and quantitative criteria, such as stress testing processes and scenario analysis, to asses the impact of ESG risks under scenarios with different severities. Hence, EBA will develop a dedicated climate stress test with the main objective of identifying banks´ vulnerabilities to climate-related risks and quantifying the relevance of the exposures that could potentially hit by climate change related risks.

Until delivering its mandates, EBA encourages institutions to adopt climate change related scenarios and use scenario analysis as an explorative tool to understand the relevance of the exposures affected by and the potential magnitude of climate change related risks.

Prudential treatment

The mandate in the CRR II asks EBA to assess if a dedicated prudential treatment of exposures to assets or activities associated with environmental or social objectives would be justified. The findings should be summarised in a report based on the input of a first to be published discussion paper.

Upshot

Between 2019 and 2025, the EBA will deliver a significant amount of work on ESG and climate change related risks. The obligations for institutions with regard to a sustainable financial economy and a more conscious handling of climate change related risks are becoming increasingly concrete. Institutions should take the EBA’s encouragement seriously and consider applying the measures recommended by the EBA prior to the publication of any guidelines, reports or technical standards.

Benchmarks Regulation: Updated ESMA Q&A bring more clarity about input data used for regulated-data benchmarks

Published on by Charlotte Dreisigacker-Sartor

To provide benchmarks, administrators rely on input data from contributors. If the contributors are regulated, the benchmarks created with their data qualify as regulated-data benchmarks. The updated Question and Answers (Q&A) of January 30, 2019 from the European Securities and Markets authority (ESMA) provide, inter alia, answers to three questions regarding input data used for regulated-data benchmarks which have been raised frequently in the market (Q&A available here). This blogpost will present these questions as well as ESMA´s answers. Beforehand, it gives a short overview of the Benchmarks Regulation´s regulatory background and explains what input data means.

Regulatory background of the Benchmarks Regulation

Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 concerning indices used as a reference value or as a measure of the performance of an investment fund for financial instruments and financial contracts (Benchmarks Regulation – BMR) sets out the regulatory requirements for administrators, contributors and users of an index as a reference value for a financial product with respect to both the production and use of the indices and the data transmitted in relation thereto. It is the EU’s response to the manipulation of LIBOR and EURIBOR. The BMR aims to ensure that indices produced in the EU and used as a reference value cannot be subject to such manipulation again. In previous blogposts on the BMR, we have already dealt with the requirements for contingency plans and non-significant benchmarks (ESMA publishes Final Report on Guidelines on non-significant benchmarks- Part 1 and Part 2.)

Input data

For a benchmark to be created, the administrator, i.e. the person/entity who has control over the provision of the reference value, relies on data he receives from contributors. These data used by an administrator to determine a benchmark in relation to the value of one ore more underlying asset or prices qualify as input data under the BMR.

With this in mind, what are the market-relevant questions regarding input data that are answered in the updated Q&A by ESMA? 

  • Can a benchmark qualify as a regulated-data benchmark if a third party is involved in the process of obtaining the data?

Under the rules of the BMR, a benchmark only qualifies as a regulated-data benchmark if the input data is entirely and directly submitted by contributors who are themselves regulated (e.g. trading venues). Since the input data come exclusively from entities that are themselves subject to regulation, the BMR sets fewer requirements for the provision of benchmarks from regulated data than for other benchmarks. This precludes, in principle, the involvement of any third party in the data collection process. The data should be sourced entirely and directly from regulated entities without the involvement of third parties, even if these third parties function as a pass-through and do not modify the raw data.

However, if an administrator obtains regulated data through a third party service provider (such as data vendor) and has in place arrangements with such service provider that meet the outsourcing requirements of the BMR, the administrator´s benchmark still qualifies as regulated-data benchmark. The third party being subject to the BMR´s outsourcing requirements ensures a quality of the input data contributed by this third party comparable to the quality of the input data contributed by a regulated entity.

  • Can NAV of investment funds qualify as benchmark?

The net asset value (NAV) of an investment fund is its value per share or unit on a given date or a given time. It is calculated by subtracting the fund´s liabilities from its assets, the result of which is divided by the number of units to arrive at the per share value. It is most widely used determinant of the fund´s market value and very often it is published on any trading day.

But, according to the BMR stipulations, the NAVs of investment funds are data that, if used solely or in conjunction with regulated data as a basis to calculate a benchmark, qualify the resulting benchmark as a regulated-data benchmark. The BMR therefore treats NAVs as a form of input data that is regulated and, consequently, should not be qualified as indices.

  • Can the methodology of a benchmark include factors that are not input data?

The methodology of a benchmark can include factors that are not input data. These factors should not measure the underlying market or economic reality that the benchmark intends to measure, but should instead be elements that improve the reliability and representativeness of the benchmark. This should be, according to ESMA, considered as the essential distinction between the factors embedded in the methodology and input data.

For instance, the methodology of an equity benchmark may include, together with the values of the underlying shares, a number of other elements, such as the free-float quotas, dividends, volatility of the underlying shares etc. These factors are included in the methodology to adjust the formula in order to get a more precise quantification of the equity market that the benchmark intends to measure, but they do net represent the price of the shares part of the equity benchmark.

Upshot

The updated ESMA Q&A provide more clarity for market participants on the understanding of input data and its use for regulated-data benchmarks. ESMA´s input will facilitate dealing with the regulatory requirements of the BMR, at least with regard to input data.

ESAs publish joint report on regulatory sandboxes and innovation hubs – Part 2

Published on by Charlotte Dreisigacker-Sartor

On January 7th 2019 the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) (consisting of ESMA, EBA and EIOPA) published as part of the European Commission’s FinTech Action Plan a joint report on innovation facilitators (i.e. regulatory sandboxes and innovation hubs). The report sets out a comparative analysis of the innovation facilitators established to date within the EU including the presentation of best practices for the design and operation of innovation facilitators.

We take the report as an occasion to present both innovation hubs and regulatory sandboxes in a two-part article. After we highlighted innovation hubs in Part 1, Part 2 will shed some light on regulatory sandboxes.

Regulatory sandboxes – What they are and what their goals are

The EU Commission´s FinTech Action plan provides for regulatory sandboxes to create an environment in which supervision is specifically tailored to innovative firms or services. ESMA’s joint report follows on from the FinTech Action plan and investigates the previous equipment and experience with regulatory sandboxes.

In detail, a regulatory sandbox provides a scheme to enable regulated and unregulated entities to test, pursuant to a specific testing plan agreed and monitored by the competent authority, innovative financial products, financial services or business models under real regulatory conditions before they bring the products to market.

The aim of a regulatory sandbox is to provide a monitored space in which competent authorities and firms can better understand the opportunities and risks presented by innovations and their regulatory treatment through a testing phase. Also, firms can assess the viability of innovative positions, in particular in terms of their application of and their compliance with regulatory and supervisory requirements. However, regulatory sandboxes do not entail the disapplication of regulatory requirements that must be applied as a result of EU law. On the contrary, the baseline assumption for regulatory sandboxes is that firms are required to comply with all relevant regulatory requirements applicable on the activity they are undertaking. The main goal of the regulatory sandboxes, as with the innovation hubs, is therefore to enhance the firms’ understanding of the relevant regulatory issues and, on the other hand, to enhance the competent authorities’ understanding of innovative financial products.

Where they exist and who can participate

At the date of the ESA report, five competent authorities reported operational regulatory sandboxes: Denmark, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland and UK. The sandboxes are open to incumbent institutions, new entrants and other firms. Moreover, the sandboxes are not limited to a certain part of the financial sector, rather they are cross-sectored (e.g. banking, investment services, payment services and insurances).

How does a regulatory sandbox work exactly?

Typically, regulatory sandboxes involve several phases which can be described as (i) an application phase, (ii) a preparation phase, (iii) a testing phase and (iv) an exit or evaluation phase.

Regulatory Sandbox

In the following, we briefly describe the steps taken in each phases either by the firm or by the competent authority.

Application phase

Firms interested in participating on a regulatory sandbox must submit an application by the competent authority. The applications received are judged by the competent authority against set, transparent, publicly available criteria. These criteria are, e.g. (i) the scope of the propositions, i.e. does the firm’s business model to be tested in the regulatory sandbox involve regulated financial services, (ii) the innovativeness of the firm’s proposition and (iii) the readiness of the firm to test its proposition. Whether the company is ready for a regulatory test phase in the sandbox is judged on the basis whether or not the firm has, e.g., developed a business plan or has obtained the appropriate software license.

Preparation phase

During the preparation phase, the competent authorities work with the firms deemed to be eligible to participate in the regulatory sandboxes to determine:

  • whether or not the proposition to be tested involves a regulated activity. If this is the case and the firm does not already hold the appropriate license, the firm will be required to seek the appropriate license in order to progress to the testing phase,
  • if any operational requirements need to be put in place to support the test (e.g. systems and controls, reporting),
  • the parameters for the test (such as number of clients, restrictions on serving specific clients, restrictions on disclosure),
  • the plan for the engagement between the firm and the competent authority during the testing phase.

Testing phase

The testing phase allows sufficient opportunity for the proposition to be fully tested and for the opportunities and risks to be explored. Throughout the testing phase, the firm is expected to communicate with the competent authority through a direct on-site presence, meetings, regulator calls or pre-agreed written reports. According the ESAs report, the supervision during the testing phase in a regulatory sandbox is experienced as a more intense supervision by the competent authority than the usual supervisory engagement outside the sandbox.

From the perspective of the competent authority, the value of the testing phase in the regulatory sandbox can be found in the opportunity to understand the application of the regulatory framework with regard to the innovative proposition and in the opportunity to built in appropriate safeguards for innovative propositions, for example with regard to consumer protection considerations. On the other hand, the value for the firms can be found in gaining better appreciation of the application of the regulatory scheme and supervisory expectations regarding the innovative propositions.

Evaluation phase

In the evaluation phase, the firm either submits to the authority a final report so that an assessment of the test can be carried out, or the competent authority will evaluate the success of the test by drawing on input provided by the firm. It should be noted that the test can be considered a success in many ways. Thus, not only the result that the product can be successfully established on the market under the tested regulatory conditions can be regarded as a success, but also the recognition that it is not possible for a proposition to be viably applied at the markets in the light of the existing regulatory and supervisory obligations.

Why is there no regulatory sandbox in Germany?

Unlike in Denmark, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK, the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – BaFin) has not set up a regulatory sandbox in Germany. In the past, BaFin promoted the view that each market participant needs to observe all regulatory requirements. One of the reasons behind that was and is the customer protection and equal treatment of companies. BaFin cites the fact that the sandbox model promotes conflicts of interest as the main reason for this:[1] after all, how would a supervisor behave if a FinTech, which BaFin had previously taken care of in its sandbox, did not treat his customers the way it should?[2]

Upshot

Regulatory sandboxes offer interested companies a good opportunity to test the products they develop under real regulatory conditions and in a supervisory environment specially tailored to innovative companies and therefore to better understand all (regulatory) possibilities and risks on the innovative product. It should be emphasized though that regulatory sandboxes do not apply a supervision light; rather all regulatory requirements must be fulfilled, especially with regard to a required authorisation. However, precise testing under real regulatory conditions and close monitoring by the supervisory authority can provide companies with important insights into their innovative products.

[1] New Year’s press reception of BaFin 2016, Speech by Felix Hufeld, President of BaFin, in Frankfurt am Main on 12 January 2016, available at https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Reden/re_160112_neujahrspresseempfang_p.html (accessed on 22 January 2019).

[2] New Year’s press reception of BaFin 2016, Speech by Felix Hufeld, President of BaFin, in Frankfurt am Main on 12 January 2016, available at https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Reden/re_160112_neujahrspresseempfang_p.html (accessed on 22 January 2019).

ESMA Supervisory briefing on the supervision of non-EU branches of EU firms providing investment services and activities

Published on by Charlotte Dreisigacker-Sartor

With Brexit coming up, many companies, especially those in the financial sector, have taken precautions and relocated their EU head offices to one of the 27 remaining EU member state to ensure that, whatever the outcome of the Brexit negotiations, they will have access to the European single market.  Offices in the UK, which will qualify as a third country after Brexit, will often be operated as branches.

On February 6, 2019, ESMA published its MIFID II Supervisory briefing on the supervision of non-EU branches of EU firms providing investment services and activities. Through its new Supervisory briefing, ESMA aims to ensure effective oversight of the non-EU branches by the competent authority of the firm´s home member state.

This article provides an overview of the measures proposed by ESMA to national regulatory authorities, divided into three areas: (i) ESMA´s supervisory expectations in relation to the authorisation of investment firms; (ii) the supervision of ongoing activities of non-EU branches by the competent authority; and (iii) ESMA´s proposed supervisory activity of the competent authority.

Supervisory expectations in relation to the authorisation of investment firms

The relocation of a company to the EU means that an authorisation covering the respective business model must be applied for in the respective EU member state. The authorisation procedure must, inter alia, include a description of the company’s organisational structure, including its non-EU branches. The competent authority should be satisfied that the use of the non-EU branch is based on objective reasons linked to the services provided in the non-EU jurisdiction and does not result in situations where such non-EU branches perform material functions or provide services back into the EU, while the office relocated to the EU is only used as a letter box entity. To this end, the competent authority should make its judgement on the substance of the business activity, the organisation, the governance and the risk management arrangements of the applicant in relation to the establishment and the use of branches in non-EU jurisdictions. Therefore, the firm´s program of operations should explain how the relocated EU head office will be able to monitor and manage any non-EU branch, clarify the role of the non-EU branch and provide detailed information, such as:

  • an overview of how the non-EU branch will contribute to the investment firm´s strategy;
  • the activities and functions that will be performed by the non-EU branch;
  • a description of how the firm will ensure that any local requirements in the non-EU jurisdiction do not interfere with the compliance by the EU firm with legal requirements applicable to it in accordance with EU law.

Supervision of ongoing activities of non-EU branches

In order to allow the competent authority to appropriately monitor firms providing investment services or activities on an ongoing basis, firms should provide the competent authority of its home member state with relevant information on any new non-EU branch that they plan to establish or on any material change in the activities of non-EU branches already established. Therefore, the competent authority should, taking into account the importance of non-EU branches for the relevant firm, request on an ad hoc or a periodic basis, information on, inter alia:

  • the number and the geographical distribution of clients served by the non-EU branches;
  • the activities and the functions provided by the non-EU branch to the EU head office.

Supervisory activity of the competent authority

The competent authority should put in place internal criteria and arrangements to supervise comprehensively and in sufficient depth the activities that branches of EU firms under their supervision perform outside of the EU. For that purpose, the competent authority should prepare plans for the supervision of non-EU branches of EU firms and identify resources dedicated to this activity. These resources should be capable of performing a critical screening of the firms under their supervision that have established non-EU branches, including, information received or requested in relation to these branches.

Upshot

As the Supervisory briefing shows, EU supervisors are urged by ESMA to ensure that companies relocating to the EU as a result of Brexit are not just used as mere letter box entities to gain access to the European single market and the actual investment services are provided via the non-EU branch. Therefore, the competent authorities should take a closer look at the firm´s non-EU branches, to ensure that the branch has the function of a branch not only on paper but also in practice. Investment firms should be prepared for this supervisory practice.